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THE principal developments during the survey period were decisions by
ITexas and federal courts breaking new ground in several areas.' In addi-
tion, the Securities Exchange Commission issued significant new regulations
relating to the intrastate and private offering exemptions to the Securities Act
of 1933.
I. GENERAL CORPORATE DEVELOPMENTS
Corporate Repurchases of Stock. Corporate repurchases of stock for promis-
sory notes are very common since in effect they involve repurchase of stock
out of future earnings of the corporation and, therefore, are convenient de-
vices to liquidate the interest of shareholders in close corporations. In
Williams v. Nevelow 2 the Texas Supreme Court authoritatively construed the
pre-1973 version of article 2.03 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 3
which regulates such transactions, and, by dictum, cast unnecessary doubt as
to how the post-1973 version of that article should be construed. This
decision has considerable practical importance and has potential application
outside of Texas because the problem of construction raised under the 1973
amendments is also present in the language of the corresponding provision
of the Model Business Corporation Act. 4
-In Nevelow a corporation repurchased its stock for a promissory note and
the issue was the proper time to apply the earned surplus require-
ment and the insolvency limitation of article 2.03. The note that was given
was secured by a lien on all the assets of the corporation; at the time the
stock was surrendered and the note issued the corporation had sufficient
earned surplus to cover the note, and its issuance did not render the corpora-
tion insolvent. However, at the time the lien was foreclosed to pay the note,
the corporation was insolvent and in the hands of a bankruptcy trustee, who
sued to set aside the foreclosure and sale. Since the transactions occurred
before the effective date of the 1973 amendments, the court was faced with
* B.A. Swarthmore College; J.D. University of Chicago. Vinson, Elkins, Searls,
Connally and Smith Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. One legislative development that should receive at least footnote recognition is
the enactment of the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Pub.
L. No. 93-406 (Sept. 2, 1974). This statute not only regulates pension and retirement
plans but also increases the maximum permissible income tax deductions for self-em-
ployed retirement plans (Keogh plans) to $7,500 per year. The old maximum was
$2,500 per year. As a practical matter, this change may tend to make professional cor-
porations and professional associations less attractive by improving the tax benefits
available to the professional in a traditional proprietorship or partnership.
2. 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974).
3. Ch. 64, art. 2.03, [1955] Tex. Laws 239.
4. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6 (2d ed. 1971).
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the question whether the payment of the note was valid under the following
statutory provisions:
C. Upon resolution of its 'board of directors authorizing the purchase
a corporation may purchase its own shares to the extent of
unrestricted earned surplus available therefor ...
[F.] In no case shall a corporation purchase its own shares when there
is a reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is insol-
vent, or will be rendered insolvent by such purchase or when, after
such purchase, the fair value of its total assets will be less than the
total amount of its debts. 5
Under these provisions, two tests had to be met at the time of the "pur-
chase": there must be available earned surplus and the corporation must
be solvent in both the equity and bankruptcy senses. If the "pur-
chase" occurred when the stock was surrendered and the secured note issued,
the shareholder wins, while if the "purchase" occurred when the note was
paid, the shareholder certainly loses under article 2.03(F) and probably un-
der article 2.03(C) as well. Most of the cases that have considered the ques-
tion have concluded that the "purchase" occurs when assets leave the corpo-
ration, i.e., when the note is paid-but there is some authority to the con-
trary,6 and until Nevelow the issue was an open one in Texas. The Texas
Supreme Court rejected the majority view and held that the "purchase" took
place when the note was given. It relied primarily on a case-law definition
of "purchase" as "the transmission of property from one person to another by
voluntary act and agreement, founded on a valuable consideration;"'7
this definition appears in early cases dealing with problems totally un-
related to corporate purchase of stock." The court further stated that "no
statute is known to use the term 'purchase'" to mean the time tangible assets
leave the corporation rather than the giving of a noteY The court then cited
the Business and Commerce Code' ° and the Texas Sales Tax Act" defini-
tions of "purchase," again, statutes involving totally different contexts from
the one before the court. Finally, and most persuasively, the court argued
5. Ch. 64, arts. 2.03(C), (F), [1955] Tex. Laws 241 (emphasis added).
6. The leading cases supporting the proposition that these tests are to be applied
at the time of each payment on the note are Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), and Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d
756 (5th Cir. 1935). See generally Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus
Limitations, 79 HARV. L. REv. 303 (1965). The minority view is set forth in Wolff
v. Heidritter Lumber Co., '1112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140 (Ch. 1932), and is advocated
in Hartmann & Wilson, Payment for Repurchased Shares Under the Texas Business Cor-
poration Act, 26 Sw. L.J. 725 (1972).
7. E.g., Spur Ind. School Dist. v. W.A. Holt Co., 88 S.W.2d 1071, 1073 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1935, no writ).
8. The court relied on Cobb v. Webb, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 64 S.W. 792 (1901,
writ ref'd), relating to the application of a statute giving a purchaser 90 days from the
date of "purchase" to pay past-due property taxes and avoid a tax sale, and Spur Ind.
School Dist. v. W.A. Holt Co., 88 S.W.2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, no writ),
involving the question whether an independent school district or a semi-related athletic
association "purchased" (and therefore had to pay for) certain athletic equipment.
9. 513 S.W.2d at 537.
10. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(32) (1968).
11. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(G) (1969).
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that the opposite construction of "purchase" would be inconsistent with ar-
ticle 2.03(E), which requires earned surplus to be "restricted" during the
period reacquired shares are held as treasury shares; the court pointed out
that such "restrictions" may be eliminated by the cancellation of the shares
even though the note is still outstanding. The court argued -that "[i]f it were
held that the corporation must have a surplus when the cash payment is made
on the note, the effect would be to require as much as double the amount
of the surplus as the price paid for the stock." 12 While this is true, the simple
explanation is that article 2.03(E) was apparently drafted on the assumption
that tangible assets rather than promissory notes would be used to repurchase
the shares. On this assumption the accounting treatment set forth in article
2.03(E) makes sense: so long -as repurchased shares are held as treasury
shares, the earned surplus they represent is restricted so that it can be written
off if -the shares are cancelled, or suitably adjusted if the shares are resold
for a valuable consideration. Nevertheless, the court is correct 'that article
2.03(E) is anomalous if the majority view is adopted, and that certainly is
an argument for adopting the minority view, as the court in fact did.
The basic problem with article 2.03, before it was amended in 1973, was
that both the earned surplus and insolvency tests were tied to the same event,
the "purchase." Abstractly, it makes sense to apply the earned surplus test
only at the point in time when the shares are surrendered and the notes is-
sued, and the insolvency test both at the point in time when assets leave the
corporation and at the point in time when the shares are surrendered. First,
it makes sense to apply the earned surplus test at the time promissory notes
are issued and the shares surrendered, since at that time the corporation must
account for the increase in liabilities reflected by the notes. This usually will
be offset by a reduction or segregation of the earned surplus account. Sec-
ond, it does not make sense to apply the earned surplus test at the time notes
are paid because of the problem pointed out by the court and because the
payment of a note as an accounting matter reduces the asset accounts of the
corporation to match the reduction of liabilities of the corporation and does
not affect the earned surplus account. Third, it makes sense to apply the
insolvency test at the time the notes are issued, since if the corporation is
insolvent, creditors should be able to object to a transaction that increases
the corporation's liabilities without increasing its real assets. Finally, it also
makes sense to apply the insolvency test at the time the note is being paid:
if the corporation is insolvent, one creditor is being favored over other credi-
tors, and it is entirely reasonable to treat a debt that reflects the earlier re-
purchase of an equity interest in the corporation as being of lesser status than
debts to trade and other creditors generally, even though they may be subse-
quent to the issuance of the notes. This has been the historical justification
for limiting the power of a corporation to repurchase its shares and is consist-
ent with the fact that a corporate repurchase of its own stock is essentially
equivalent to a disproportionate dividend distribution.
In effect, the Texas Supreme Court determined to apply the insolvency
12. 513 S.W.2d at 538.
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test only at the time the note was issued because both tests are tied to an
event denominated a "purchase," and since the earned surplus test should
be applied at the point of "purchase," the insolvency test should also be ap-
plied then. Even though the court's reasoning is involuted, it is not neces-
sarily wrong. Given the language of the statute before it was amended in
1973, its conclusion seems reasonable enough even though it reflects a minor-
ity position in the case law and it permits a former shareholder sometimes
to get ahead of legitimate trade creditors, as in the Nevelow case. In
any event, the decision would appear to have limited effectiveness because
the 1973 amendments to article 2.03(F) are applicable to all redemptions
after August 27, 1973.
The 1973 amendments did not affect article 2.03(C) which requires the
presence of earned surplus at the time of the "purchase." However, article
2.03(F) was amended by adding the italicized language:
F. In no case shall a corporation purchase or make payment, directly
or indirectly, for its own shares when there is a reasonable ground
for believing that the corporation is insolvent, or will be rendered
insolvent by such purchase or payment, or when, after such pur-
chase, or payment, the fair value of its total assets will be less than
the total amount of its debts.' 8
This article obviously draws a distinction between "purchase" and "payment,"
and, in the words of Professor Herwitz, "the inference is well-nigh irresistible
that the surplus test is to be applied to the total repurchase obligation at the
outset"'14 and the insolvency test is to be applied both at the outset and at
the time of each payment. But the Texas Supreme Court did not think that
was necessarily so. In commenting on the 1973 amendments, the court said:
We note that sec. F of art. 2.03 of the Texas Business Corporation Act
was amended in 1973 . . . . The addition of 'payment' indicates some
distinction between 'payment' and 'purchase.' It does not necessarily
follow that a different result would be reached in the present case if
the amended language of the statute with reference to the solvency of
the corporation were applicable. The issuance of a secured negotiable
instrument could be considered 'payment' for the repurchased stock.
Hartman and Wilson, supra, 26 Sw. L.J. 725, 735. A decision on this
point is not necessary to the disposition of the present case. In view of
the historical judicial prohibition against enforcement of otherwise un-
conditional promises of payment after the time of insolvency, it would be
well for the Legislature to settle the question expressly. 15
The law review article which the court cited is addressed primarily to the
thesis that the earned surplus requirement should be met at the time the
shares are surrendered and the note issued. However, in the course of their
discussion, the writers assert that giving a negotiable promissory note may
constitute "payment" for the sales of goods sections of the Uniform Commer-
13. TEX. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.03(F) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
14. Herwitz, supra note 6, at 323.
15. 513 S.W.2d at 538-39.
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cial Code.' Throughout the discussion by Hartmann and Wilson, and
throughout the opinion by the supreme court, there is a regrettable tendency
to consider elastic words such as "purchase" and "payment" as having invari-
ant meanings irrespective of the context in which they are used. Undoubt-
edly, for some purposes, such as ascertaining who bears the risk of loss of
goods after they have been delivered in exchange for a check or promissory
note, the giving of the check or note may constitute "payment;" such a trans-
action also constitutes a "purchase." However, it is a serious mistake in legal
analysis to assume that these words must have the same meaning in a care-
fully drawn statutory provision which obviously attempts to distinguish be-
tween "purchase" and "payment." In this respect, the Bar Committee com-
ment describing the 1973 amendments should not be ignored: "The 1973
amendments to Art. 2.03 also added the phrase 'or make payment, directly
or indirectly,' to Section F. This amendment assures that the insolvency limi-
tation is applied both at the time of purchase and at the time of payment.
The surplus restriction of Art. 2.03(E) is not affected by the amendment
and applies only at the date of purchase . 17
At the risk of restating the obvious, I would like to summarize how I feel
that article 2.03, as amended, should be construed, the dictum in Nevelow
to the contrary notwithstanding: (1) Where a corporation acquires its own
shares in exchange for one or more promissory notes, the transaction must
meet both the earned surplus test of article 2.03(C) and the insolvency test
of article 2.03(F) at that time. In other words, there must be sufficient
earned surplus to cover all the promissory notes issued,' 8 and after the notes
are issued the corporation must not be insolvent in either the equity or bank-
ruptcy sense. Either is possible, even if the corporation has sufficient earned
surplus on its books to cover the notes. For example, because of declines
in market value of corporate assets, the issuance of the notes may cause the
"fair value of its total assets" to be less than "the total amount of its debts"
(the bankruptcy test), and the additional liability on the notes may make
it impossible for the corporation to pay its debts as they mature (the equity
test). (2) When each note is paid, the corporation must be solvent in both
the equity and bankruptcy sense. A corporation that is or will be rendered
insolvent cannot pay the notes. In this sense, a person who becomes a credi-
tor of the corporation by the sale of his shares to the corporation is subordi-
nate to all other creditors. Since the corporation was insolvent in Nevelow
when Williams' note was paid, it follows that that case should have been de-
16. Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 6, at 735. The word "payment" is not itself
defined in the Uniform Commercial Code; the argument is based on the definition of
"value," TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(44) (1968), plus an inference based
on the provision of the UCC relating to passing of title. Id. § 2.401.
17. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.03, 3A TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 28
(Supp. 1974).
18. In this respect, the requirements of art. 2.03 are more onerous than the require-
ments imposed by the majority view in cases such as Mountain States Steel Foundries,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960). See note 6 supra. Those cases
require that there be sufficient earned surplus to cover each note at the time each is
paid, but do not require that there be sufficient earned surplus to cover all the notes
at the time they are issued.
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cided differently if it had arisen under the post-1973 version of article 2.03.
The Texas Supreme Court also recognized a general principle that repur-
chase of shares by a corporation is subject to equitable limitations on the pur-
pose of the acquisition.19  Thus, Professor Hornstein points to repurchases
designed to perpetuate or shift control, to bail out selected shareholders, and
the like.20  In addition, the principle known as the "Deep Rock" doctrine
permits courts in insolvency proceedings to subordinate the claims of officers
and shareholders when it appears that the claims are the result of "the viola-
tion of rules of fair play and good conscience by the claimant; [or] a breach
of the fiduciary standards of conduct which he owes the corporation, its stock-
holders and creditors."'21 In Nevelow the Texas Supreme Court stated that
"fraud or bad faith or conduct misleading to the creditors" must be shown
in order for the bankruptcy trustee to rescind the purchase and foreclosure,
a considerably narrower test.22 Nevertheless, on the facts of Nevelow, the
bankruptcy trustee had a reasonable argument for rescission under the prin-
ciples set forth by the court; 23 the court rejected these arguments in part be-
cause they apparently had not been raised or fully developed below.
Where mandatory buy-out arrangements are being considered and a ques-
tion exists as to the lawfulness of a repurchase under article 2.03, it may be
sensible to require other shareholders who are interested in the transaction
to guarantee, in their individual capacities, the performance of the buy-sell
transaction. This may take the form either of a promise to purchase the
shares if the corporation does not, or a guarantee of payment of notes issued
by the corporation if the purchase price is to be paid over a period of time.
Recent case law squarely holds that such individual obligations are enforce-
able without regard to the status of the corporation. 24
Sale of Control Premiums. One of the more perplexing problems in the area
of fiduciary duties is the proper treatment of the controlling shareholder who
sells his shares at a premium over the current market price or over the price
offered to minority shareholders. The premium, of course, represents the
practical value that a corporate office and working control of a corporation
represent. Where a purchaser is willing to pay a substantial premium for
control, there is obviously some risk that the corporation will suffer at his
hands. Furthermore, there is a deep-seated notion that since shares are fun-
gible, it is unfair for the controlling shareholder to receive a higher price than
other shareholders. Finally, transfers of control can often be recast as mer-
gers or other transactions in which all shareholders are treated equally; a
19. 513 S.W.2d at 538.
20. 1 G. HORNSTErN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 495 (1959).
21. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-11 (1939).
22. 513 S.W.2d at 538.
23. The note given was a secured note covering all the assets of the corporation.
It provided that it could not be prepaid if another promissory note given by the persons
who were assuming control of the corporation from Williams was unpaid, and also the
note of the corporation could be matured at the option of the holder upon default of
payment on the other note. 513 S.W.2d at 538.
24. Olivares v. Zars, 508 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Hall v. Weller, Hall & Jeffery, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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controlling shareholder who sells at a premium may be usurping an oppor-
tunity that arguably belongs to all. On the other hand, there is an equally
deep-seated notion that a person should be able to dispose of his property
at whatever price he can get, and that fungible property may be willingly sold
by different persons at different prices. These fundamental and essentially
conflicting principles have given rise to a series of troubled opinions in other
jurisdictions. While the state of the law is in flux, the majority view is that a
control premium is not inherently improper, and is not automatically a cor-
porate asset, to be shared by all shareholders proportionately, but that in a
variety of circumstances, the controlling shareholders might be called upon to
share the premium with the other shareholders. 25
This question was raised squarely in Texas during the survey period. In
Thompson v. Hambrick26 the controlling shareholders received an offer to
buy stock (presumably all of the shares of the corporation, though that is
not entirely clear) at forty-five dollars per share. They rejected this offer,
but then agreed with the purchaser that -they would sell sufficient shares to
assure control at fifty-five dollars per share. At about the same time, the
controlling shareholders purchased the stock of one of the minority share-
holders for forty dollars per share.
The Dallas court rejected the position extensively espoused in law review
articles that control should be considered to be a corporate asset that must
be shared with the minority shareholders. Rather, after considering the
classic cases that arguably lead the way toward such a conclusion 27-and the
leading Texas case on the doctrine of corporate opportunity28-the court
adopted the more standard view that controlling shareholders may sell their
shares at a premium subject to the following exceptions: (1) Where there
is fraud on the part of the dominant directors and shareholders; (2) where
the controlling shareholders turn over their shares to purchasers who misman-
age the corporation or loot the corporate assets; (3) where non-controlling
shareholders are induced to sell their shares by concealment of the fact that
a premium is to be paid to the controlling shareholders; (4) where control-
ling shareholders make a "secret profit" from the transaction; or (5) where
directors are dealing directly with the corporation to their own personal ad-
vantage, known or unknown. These rather loosely phrased exceptions cover
the principal situations in which courts in other jurisdictions have held the
controlling shareholder accountable; the basic problem with such an enum-
eration is that if literally applied one or more of them will be applicable
in virtually every case.
25. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 729 (1973)
for a discussion of the principal cases and law review commentary on the problem of
control premiums.
26. 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The problem
had been discussed in dicta in Calvert v. Capital Sw. Corp., 441 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 321 (1970).
27. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., .1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
28. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
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In the actual case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the controlling shareholders. The appellate court reversed, stating that there
clearly were fact issues as to the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, based on
the following circumstances: "[T]he defendants, shortly after joining in the
rejection of the $45 per share offer, made a secret agreement to sell their
stock at $55 per share to the same people who had made the previous offer,
without notice to the minority shareholders and giving them neither the right
of first refusal nor any participation whatever in the transaction. '29 If it is
true that the original forty-five dollars per share offer was made to all the
shareholders, the conclusion seems clearly justified. While an offer to all the
shareholders individually may not technically constitute a corporate opportun-
ity, it is the economic equivalent of an offer to purchase the assets of the
corporation followed by a subsequent liquidation. As such, it seems clearly
improper for controlling shareholders to reject this offer in order to work out
their own arrangement at a higher price to the exclusion of the minority
shareholders.
Rather surprisingly, the court also held that it was proper to grant summary
judgment against the shareholder who sold at forty dollars per share at about
the time the fifty-five dollar offer was made.3 0  This shareholder, an em-
ployee of the corporation, testified that he had made a profit of over fourteen
dollars per share and that he thought it was to his economic advantage to
make the sale. Apparently he did not say that he would have refused -to
make the sale at the lower price if he had known that the controlling share-
holders had received an offer at a considerably higher price.
Liability of Officers and Directors for 'Corporate Actions. In Seale v.
Nichols31 the Texas Supreme Court was faced with the question whether the
following form of execution of a promissory note imposed personal liability
on the defendant officer:
THE FASHION BEAUTY SALON (Typewritten in capital letters)
Carl V. Nichols (typewritten)
Carl V. Nichols (handwritten)
The printed portion of the note began, "I, we, or either of us, promise to
pay. . . ." When Nichols was sued on the promissory note, he filed an affi-
davit stating that he signed only in a representative capacity as president of
a corporation, Mr. Carl's Fashion, Inc., a Texas corporation doing business
as the Fashion Beauty Salon. The supreme court held that this affidavit did
not create a fact issue and that summary judgment was properly granted
against Nichols.32 The suit was by the payee. The court relied primarily
upon section 3.403(b) (2) of the Business and Commerce Code33 and the
29. 508 S.W.2d at 954.
30. Id.
31. 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974).
32. Id. at 255.
33. "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument . ..
(2) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obli-
gated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the repre-
19751
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basic contractual notion that even if Nichols intended to sign only in a rep-
resentational form, that intention was ineffective because it was not communi-
cated to the plaintiff. The parol evidence rule might also be cited in view
of the apparent unambiguous form of execution. The case emphasizes the
extreme importance of using the standard form of execution when a person








While some variations in this form may be possible without subjecting X to
personal liability, any variation involves some risk.
The sometimes complex problem of whether a corporation may be person-
ally liable for tortious conduct was also considered by the Texas Supreme
Court during the survey period. In Maxey v. Citizens National Bank3 4 the
court construed a petition as charging that a bank had breached its duty as
a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage, and could, therefore, be liable even
though none of its officers or agents were personally liable. The court of
civil appeals had construed the petition as charging only fraud, conversion,
and conspiracy, for which, it argued, the bank could be liable only on the
theory of respondeat superior.35 In the course of its opinion, the Texas Su-
preme Court restated many of the principles underlying the immunity of cor-
porate officers and directors from liability for good faith, non-tortious con-
duct, even though poor judgment was exercised.
Finally, a federal district court held that a director may not avoid his stat-
utory liability under article 2.41(A)(2) of the Texas Business Corporation
Act3 6 for the repurchase of his shares while the corporation was insolvent by
the simple expedient of resigning before the purchase is approved.3 7  The
court simply stated that the transaction was an integrated one, though the
same result could be reached on other theories as well.
Authority of Officers and Agents. The scope of the implied authority of of-
ficers and agents has long been unsettled and unsatisfactory."" During the
survey period, the Texas Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify this
area but did not choose to do so, possibly on the ground that the case under
consideration did not lend itself to suitable generalization. In Douglas v.
Panama, Inc. 9 the court simply held that the president of a corporation
lacked actual authority to promise bonuses to employees, a fact which the
sentative signed in a representative capacity .... 9 TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.403(b)(2) (1968).
34. 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974).
35. 489 S.W.2d 697, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ granted).
36. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.41(A) (2) (1956).
37. In re Gribbin Supply Co., 371 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
38. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, § 585. Dissatisfaction with the state of
,the law in this area is also expressed in the earlier treatise by Dean Hildebrand. 2 J.
HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 640 (1942).
39. 504 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1974).
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president himself recognized, and that in any event the bonuses were unen-
forceable, because they were indefinite and uncertain.
In Dowdle v. Texas American Oil Corp.40 a former director and president
of a publicly held corporation claimed that he was entitled to severance pay
on the basis of a "policy" established by him two years earlier for other em-
ployees. The "policy" was adopted by the president after consultation with
members of the board of directors and executive committee of the corporation
but without formal action by either. The court rejected the former presi-
dent's claim, relying partially on cases involving self dealing,41 partially on
the language of the plaintiff's employment resolution that made no mention
of severance pay, and partially on the idea that a board of directors must
act as a board when setting compensation. The court did not specifically
consider whether the president had authority to establish such a "policy" cov-
ering all employees but himself without directoral approval.
Informal Dividends. In Ramo, Inc. v. English42 the Texas Supreme Court
carefully considered whether an informal distribution from a subsidiary to a
parent corporation constituted an "informal dividend" which would trigger an
acceleration clause in a loan agreement. The advances were called "loans,"
"open accounts," and "advance receivables" on the books and records of both
corporations, but a jury found that the parent had no intention of repaying
them at the time they were made. Disagreeing with the court of appeals, 43
the supreme court held that such advances did not trigger the acceleration
clause. Acceleration, the court argued, is a harsh remedy that should be per-
mitted only where the clause is clear, unequivocal, and open to no other con-
struction. An intention not to repay is not conclusive since the parent may
have been legally obligated to do so despite its intention, given the treatment
of the advances on the books of the corporation. Further, at the time the
loan agreement was made, both the creditor and debtor had reason to be
aware of the possibility of advances and had not specifically prohibited
them.44
The case seems to be a close one on its facts, and the emphasis given by
the court to the harsh nature of acceleration probably means that the case
should not be considered authority in other contexts, e.g., federal income
taxation. The opinion itself contains a useful discussion of the difference be-
tween a loan and an informal dividend:
A distribution of money or property by a corporation to its shareholders
may constitute a dividend in law even though not formally designated
as such by the board of directors.
40. 503 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso ,1973, no writ).
41. Id. at 651-52, citing Nelms v. A & A 'Liquor Stores, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wiberg v. Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co.,
360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973).
43. 474 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ granted).
44. The transaction arose in connection with the sale of the shares of the subsidiary
by the plaintiff to the defendant corporation. The subsidiary had made informal ad-
vances to the former shareholders when they were in control; the failure to specifically
prohibit such advances in the agreement is at least some indication that they were not
to be prohibited. 500 S.W.2d at 465.
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A loan is an advance of money on an agreement, express or implied,
to repay at some time in the future, while the term 'dividend' as ordi-
narily used means a corporate distribution that the shareholder is en-
titled to receive and retain without any obligation of repayment. A
basic and essential difference between a loan and a dividend then is the
presence or absence of a legal obligation to repay. .... 45
Shortly after Ramo was decided, a court of civil appeals, faced with the
question whether a payment from a subsidiary to a parent constituted a loan
or a payment for stock, applied analogous principles and concluded that "a
legal obligation to repay" existed under the complex circumstances of that
case.
46
Piercing the Corporate Veil. The Texas courts continue to resolve issues re-
lating to the nature of the corporate entity on the basis of the conclusion-
oriented language of "alter ego" rather than by an analysis of the policy issues
that are involved in the case. 47 Thus, in one case arising during the survey
period, this conceptual analysis was applied to give one creditor priority over
another creditor under the materialmen's lien statute, even though the first
creditor dealt with an "alter ego" of the corporation owning the land on which
the materials were placed.48  In another case, a court permitted a wholly
owned subsidiary corporation to enforce a covenant not to compete, even
though the covenant was made with the parent corporation and there had
been no formal assignment. The court stated that because the subsidiary was
wholly owned, to require a formal assignment would be "to compel a form-
alistic, empty act."'49 On the other hand, a federal district court held that
the existence of a wholly owned and dominated subsidiary corporation doing
business in Texas did not make the foreign parent corporation, Procter and
Gamble Company, subject to suit in Texas to declare a patent invalid, since
the affairs of the parent and subsidiary were sufficiently differentiated so that
two separate entities existed. 0 In a personal injury case where the injury
occurred in Texas, the presence in Texas of a totally dominated and inte-
grated corporation was sufficient to permit service on a sister corporation not
45. Id.
46. Star Corp. v. General Screw Prods. Co., 501 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court also concluded that if corpora-
tion A pays an obligation of corporation B, under circumstances that indicate no gift
was intended, corporation B is obligated as a matter of law to reimburse corporation
A for such payment. Id. at 380-81.
47. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979 (1971). See also
Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 144 (1972),
where the author suggests that judges and lawyers, "although probably aware that use
of the corporate fiction has its conceptual limits if they stop to think about the matter,
instinctively resort to the time-worn, but resounding, expressions and pejoratives that
abound in the disregard cases."
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 502 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973), rev'd, 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1975). The Texas Supreme Court also used the
"alter ego" analysis and cited with approval the discussion by the court of civil appeals
on this point. 517 S.W.2d at 265.
49. Williams v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 508 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
50. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
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itself present in Texas. The court stated that "[w]hile the Jones family of
corporations may, on paper, look like separate entities for bookkeeping con-
venience and tax purposes, they are for all operational purposes one big, al-
beit well organized, corporation controlled from the top by John Wiley Jones,
his son Robert B. Jones, and a few trusted employees . . ... 51 To support
this conclusion, the court pointed to transfers of personnel freely between cor-
porations, organization-wide advertising, cooperative marketing, and the like.
I do not mean to suggest that these cases were wrongly decided. My
plea is only that courts base their decisions on reasoned policy and notions
of basic justice to litigants, and articulate their reasons for reaching a deci-
sion. The phrase "alter ego" and similar language simply mask the real rea-
sons for a court's decision.
A string of parking lots in Houston, with a habit of allowing automobiles
in its control to be stolen, seems intent on establishing the permissible limits
of the abuse of multiple corporations in litigation. In one case, the defend-
ant's representative stated upon deposition that the owner of the parking lot
was "Allright, Inc;" after the two-year statute of limitations had run, it moved
to amend its answers to this question to "Allright Houston Company." While
the court reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on procedural
grounds, 52 it seems plain that a subsequent motion to dismiss on the ground
that the wrong party defendant was named should not be permitted either
on the ground of estoppel or on the theory that the original filing tolled the
statute of limitations. In another case, a judgment against "Allright Texas,
Inc." and "Allright Garage, Inc." was upheld against the claim that the
named defendants did not operate the garage in question, since the interlock-
ing nature of five Allright corporations "constituted in reality a single business
enterprise. '53
'Finally, in Bell v. Bell 54 a divorced spouse unsuccessfully argued that the
increments in values of assets owned by two corporations should have been
further taken into account in a property settlement on the theory that the
corporations were the "alter ego" of the other spouse. While shares of stock
may be community property, the assets of the corporations themselves clearly
should not be so considered, since the value of the corporate assets will be
reflected in the valuation of the shares, and there is no reason even to con-
sider an "alter ego" argument. In Bell the spouse lost because the value of
the shares had been taken into account by the trial court in the exercise of
the broad discretion it possesses to allocate property under section 3.63 of
the Family Code.55
Shareholder/Executors. In closely held corporations share transfer restric-
tions are imposed in part to establish a mechanism by which the interest of
51. Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
52. Allright, Inc. v. Yeager, 512 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Allright Texas, Inc. v. Simons, 501 S.W.2d 145, '150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
list Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974), rev'g 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1974);.
55. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
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deceased shareholders may be liquidated and by which the value of the
shares may be ascertained for estate tax purposes. It is not uncommon in
such situations for the executor of the estate himself to be a shareholder in
the corporation. In a case of considerable practical importance to such cor-
porations, the Austin court of civil appeals5" held that if a principal share-
holder is an executor of the estate, the corporation may not exercise a preex-
isting option to purchase the deceased shareholder's stock, since the result
would be a violation of section 352 of the Texas Probate Code by the execu-
tor. That section provides that the personal representative of an estate "shall
not become the purchaser, directly or indirectly, of any property of the estate
sold by him . . . .,7 The purchase by the corporation may be deemed an
"indirect" purchase of the estate's shares by the executor.
Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by Corporations. Prior to 1971 the Texas stat-
utes5I8 permitted "any person" to recover attorneys' fees in suits involving a
valid claim for "personal services." In 1970 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a* corporation could not recover fees under this article.59 In 1971 this
statute was hmended to delete the word "personal" and to permit fees to be
reCovered by 'Iany person corporation, partnership, or other legal entity." 60
It lieems perfectly clear that the purpose of the amendments was to permit
corporations and other entities to recover attorneys' fees in successful suits
for compenshtion for the perforiance of services, and not surprisingly, two
cases during the survey period specifically so held.,'
Self-Incrmination. It is well established that a corporation may not plead
a privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, either to shield itself or its officers, directors, or share-
holders. 62 Relying on the federal precedent, a Texas court has held that a
corporation also does not have a privilege against self-incrimination under the
Texas Constitution. 63 The court was not impressed with arguments based on
the slight differences in wording between article 1, section 10, of the Texas
Constitution and the fifth amendment. 64
,56. 7-Up ,Bottling Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 505 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See the related case of Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank,
519 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 505 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1974).
57. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 352 (1956) (emphasis added).
58., Ch. 67, [1953] Tex. Laws 101..
59. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Padre Drilling Co., 453 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1970). See also
Vahlsing Christina.Corp. v. Ryman Well Service, Inc., 512 S.W.2d'803 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN;' art. 2226: (Supp. 1974).
61. Clark Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974); Maxwell
Lumber Co. v. Merle Greer Co., 501 S.W.2d 454 '(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no
writ).
62. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
63. Super X Drugs v. State, 505 S.W.2d 333, (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, no writ).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V states that "no person ...shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself," while TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 10 provides
that "[in] all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself." (emphasis added).
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In the past there has been considerable litigation with respect to the extent
to which the privilege against self-incrimination is available to partners, labor
union officials, and officers of unincorporated associations when the Govern-
ment has sought information or records that technically belonged to the unin-
corporated enterprise rather than the individual himself. During the survey
period, the United States Supreme Court rejected earlier tests and estab-
lished new principles that sharply restrict the availability of the privilege. In
Bellis v. United States65 a partner in a three-man partnership sought to in-
voke the privilege in declining to produce partnership records in his posses-
sion. The Court rejected the claim, stating that decisive considerations were
whether the partnership had "an established institutional identity independ-
ent of its individual partners" and whether the partner was holding the rec-
ords in a "representative" capacity.( The Court relied on the fact that the
privilege would not have been available if the business had been incorpo-
rated, and argued that the "applicability of the privilege should not turn on
an insubstantial difference in the form of the business enterprise." 67  The
Court added, however, that it "might be a different case if it involved a small
family partnership" or if "there were some other pre-existing relationship of
confidentiality among the partners."68 Of course, every partnership involves
a fiduciary relationship among partners;69 obviously the Court meant some
relationship in addition to this legal obligation.
Dissolved Corporations. Litigation continues to arise with respect to corpora-
tions whose charters are forfeited for non-payment of franchise taxes. In
Greig v. First National Bank7" Greig had signed a continuing guarantee of
payment of loans up to $50,000 made to a corporation in which he was in-
terested. The corporation's certificate of incorporation was forfeited for non-
payment of franchise taxes, but the corporation continued conducting its bus-
iness. During this period it executed a promissory note, and the question
was whether Greig's continuing guarantee covered this note. Not surpris-
ingly, the court held that forfeiture did not affect the validity of corporate
acts or contracts, and Greig was liable under his guarantee. The court added
that forfeiture was a revenue measure only and that the only specified pen-
alty for non-payment (closing the courts to the corporation) seemed sufficient
for that purpose. 71
Escheat. The Texas escheat statute 72 has been described as "custodial in
nature."7 3 Persons conveying property to the state treasurer under this stat-
ute are relieved from all liability, while persons with claims to the property
may file a claim with the treasurer and obtain judicial review of adverse de-
65. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id. at 101.
68. Id.
69. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21 (1970).
70. 511 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 89.
72. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3272 (1968).




cisions by him. Presumably, other states with claims that they are entitled
to the property in question under their escheat statutes may seek to reclaim
property under this statute. The Texas Supreme Court held in a case de-
cided during the survey period that Texas may escheat property held by liqui-
dating trustees of a New Mexico corporation, even though the last known
addresses of the shareholders entitled to the funds were not Texas ad-
dresses. 74  However, the funds were physically present in Texas, the
trustees were Texas residents, and most significantly, no other state was
claiming the right to escheat the funds. In reaching this result, the court re-
lied on the custodial nature of the Texas statute and the right of states to
make claims to the property under that statute.75
Share Transfer Restrictions. In the last few years Texas courts have wrestled
with several significant cases involving share transfer restrictions, and such
restrictions also have been the subject of recent legislation. 'During the sur-
vey period, however, only two share transfer restriction cases arose. In a
decision principally important for its discussion of sale of control premiums,
the court held that it was error to grant summary judgment on the issue whe-
ther a share transfer restriction was designed solely to benefit majority share-
holders and need not be complied with when they decided to sell their shares
at a price substantially above the market value of the stock. 76 ,In another
case the Fifth Circuit concluded that under 'Delaware law, a share transfer
restriction requiring resale to the corporation at book value could not lawfully
be imposed on outstanding unrestricted stock without the consent or acquies-
cence of the holder.7 7 The court relied in part on the restrictive nature of
the bylaw provision, since the evidence indicated that fair market value was
substantially higher than book value, and on the fact that the restriction ap-
peared to be broader than necessary to accomplish the valid corporate pur-
pose of limiting shareholders to van line companies.
Foreign Corporations. Article 8.02 of the Texas Business Corporation Act
provides that a foreign corporation with a certificate of authority shall "enjoy
the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a domestic corporation."' 8
Relying on this provision, a court of civil appeals held that it was improper
to dismiss a suit between two qualified corporations on a theory of forum non
conveniens. 79 The court stated that Texas courts "are required to try such
a case just as such courts would be required to try a case brought against
a Texas corporation by another Texas corporation . . . regardless of where
the cause of action might have arisen."80
74. Id.
75. Id. at 315.
76. Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
77. B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (1956).
79. Continental Oil Co. v. P.P.G. Indus., 504 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. 504 S.W.2d at 620. The court also cited a pre-TBCA case, H. Rouw Co. v.
Railway Express Agency, 154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref'd),
in support of this proposition.
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Receiverships. Decisions involving the receivership provisions of the Texas
Business Corporation Act have been relatively infrequent. One such pro-
ceeding, apparently involving an affiliate of King Commodity Company, was
reported during the survey period."' The court held that the only court with
authority to appoint a receiver for a domestic corporation was a court in
the county in which the registered office was located, that the Texas Business
Corporation Act contained the exclusive provisions relating to receiverships
for domestic corporations, and that a court could not transfer a receivership
proceeding brought in the wrong county to the proper county.8 2 These con-
clusions seem to be soundly based on the language of articles 5.05(A),
5.07(A), and 7.07(E) of the Texas Business Corporation Act.8 3
Procedural Developments. As in every year, a number of cases involve the
more or less routine application of the Texas long-arm statute and the com-
plex Texas venue statutes to specific corporations. The developments dis-
cussed below involve only those which in some sense break new ground.
The United States Supreme Court placed a sharp brake on the trend to-
ward large and formless class actions by holding that the plaintiff in every
class action must bear the cost of notice to all members of the class he claims
to represent. 84 In many instances, of course, such cost will be prohibitive.
For example, the "class" involved in this litigation constituted all persons who
had paid odd lot premiums for transactions involving less than the normal
trading unit of securities during the period May 1, 1962, through June 20,
1966. This "class," it was estimated, contained 6,000,000 members,
2,250,000 of whom would be easily identified.8 5
In a state case,8 6 the plaintiff in a derivative suit was held not to represent
adequately the class of all shareholders and therefore was not eligible to be
a plaintiff. The plaintiff was simultaneously maintaining a separate suit
seeking to rescind the transaction by which he purchased his shares, and the
court thought this indicated an inconsistent position.
Finally, additional procedural requirements were imposed on default judg-
ments. In James Edmond, Inc. v. Schilling8 7 a default judgment was set
aside for failing to allege and prove that the defendant was a foreign corpora-
tion not maintaining a regular business in Texas, and for failing to have a
court reporter at the hearing so that there could be a statement of facts avail-
able to enable the reviewing court to determine the sufficiency of the facts to
support the judgment. In another case, the Texas Supreme Court held that
to support a default judgment the record must contain proof that the secretary
of state properly forwarded process served on him to the defendant, where
81. King Commodity Co. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
no writ).
82. Id. at 446.
83. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 5.05(A), 5.07(A), 7.07(E) (Supp. 1974).
84. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
85. Id. at 166.
86. Ford v. Bimbo Corp., 512 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, no writ).
87. 501 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
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such service of process is authorized by statute."" In order to meet this re-
quirement, the secretary of state has established a standard procedure for
furnishing the required certificate for a nominal fee of two dollars.s"
A Partnership as a Separate Entity. A long and somewhat sterile debate has
raged as to whether a partnership should be considered an entity distinct from
the partners or simply an aggregate of the partners."" A surprisingly large
number of procedural and substantive consequences flow from this basic
characterization. The early Texas common law treated a partnership as an
aggregate of the partners, but the Uniform Partnership Act emphasizes the
entity aspects of partnership. The "Sources and Comments" note to section
1 of the Texas version of that act prepared by Professor Bromberg states that
"the great preponderance" of the Texas version of the Uniform Partnership
Act favors the entity theory.91 As a result, several courts of appeal have
declined to follow the early precedents classifying a partnership as an aggre-
gate. During the survey period the Texas Supreme Court for the first time
reviewed such a holding and specifically adopted the view that, for most pur-
poses at least, a partnership should be considered as a separate entity rather
than as merely an extension of the partners themselves.92 The case involved
the situs of personal property for purposes of taxation by a school district.
The supreme court specifically approved findings by the lower court that each
partnership "constituted a separate legal entity" and that they were "engaged
in separate business enterprises conducted from their principal offices and
domiciles .... ,,93 Of course, in some circumstances it may be inappropri-
ate to treat a specific partnership as a separate entity; a partnership has both
entity and aggregate aspects, and the way a partnership should be treated
as a conceptual matter depends in part on the context in which the question
arises and the consequences of adopting one concept or the other. Neverthe-
less, it now seems clear that the entity concept should generally be favored.
Incorporation ol Going Business. Generally, if a corporation is formed to
take over a going business, it will be held, on one theory or another, to have
assumed the liabilities of the business at least in the absence of an express
disclaimer. One recent case,9 4 however, apparently refused to apply this
principle, though the opinion is not very satisfactory or clear on the point.
An individual opened a service station, and a year later a corporation was
formed to continue the business. The supplier of diesel fuel to the station
inadvertently failed to collect the Texas fuel tax for several years, and then
brought suit for the unpaid tax against both the corporation and the individ-
88. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973). Southwestern Re-
modelers of Houston, Inc v. Lumaside, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston[1st Dist.] 1973, no writ), follows Whitney.
89. See 36 Thx. B.J. 1118 (1973).
90. 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note'25, §§ 151-54 (1973).
91. Bromberg, Source and Comments, 17 TEX. REV. Civ. SrAT. ANN. 299 (1970).
92. Nacogdoches Ind. School Dist. v. McKinney, 504'S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1974).
93. Id. at 834.
94. Cannon Ball Truck Stop, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 501 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ual. A judgment holding the corporation liable for all the unpaid tax was
modified to exclude the tax due on sales prior to incorporation. Perhaps the
tax liability was divisibte on a purchase-to-purchase basis; even so, however,
one normally would have expected the corporation to have assumed all the
liabilities of the business when it took over the service station, and the unpaid
diesel fuel tax on prior purchases would appear to fall into this category. Of
course, if the individual is still the principal shareholder of the corporation,
the separate liability of the corporation probably makes little difference, as
the shares presumably could be levied upon to satisfy the personal judgment
against the shareholder; however, the case may have significance where he
is no longer a shareholder in the corporation and is judgment-proof.
Partnership Dissolution. Three cases involving the dissolution of partnerships
arising during the survey period should be briefly noted. It is well under-
stood that partnership continuation agreements providing for the systematic
liquidation of the interests of deceased partners are binding on the heirs of
the deceased. One recent case extended this principle to other aspects of
the relationship between heirs and the partnership. 95 The partnership agree-
ment provided that a loan made by the partner to the partnership was to
be repaid only out of future profits; the court held that this provision pre-
cluded the estate of the deceased partner from ignoring the agreement and
treating the entire debt as immediately due.
The Texas Uniform Partnership Act contains rules of contribution between
partners that may sometimes result in an allocation of financial responsibility
that is a surprise to the partners. Of course, such rules may be altered by
agreement, and it is often important that this be done. One recent case9"
illustrates the risk of not doing so. Five partners agreed that they would
share equally in the profits of a restaurant after paying a reasonable salary
to the partner actually operating the business. There was apparently no writ-
ten partnership agreement. The managing partner contributed assets and
cash worth over $61,000; the other partners contributed cash for working
capital of $2,400 each. The business was not successful and was liquidated
after running through the bulk of the assets. Virtually all creditors were
paid; the partner contributing the $61,000 (Corsi) then successfully sought
contribution from the other four partners, so as to equalize the contributions.
This result seems called for by the provisions of the Texas Uniform Partner-
ship Act, which state that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
each partner "must contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or other-
wise, sustained by the partnership according to his share in the profits. '97
However, it is likely that the partners did not contemplate this result, which
in effect requires the fbui partnirs w o contributed working capital to restore
a substantial part of Corsi's capital.
95. Langston v. Hoenig, 494 S.W.2d 615 (TeO.Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
96. Cortez v. Corsi, 513 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ).
97. TEX. REV. Cv. SrAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(1)(a) (1970).
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Another case decided during the survey period carefully reviews the vari-
ous elections that the estate of a deceased partner has in the absence of a
partnership agreement. 98 These various options are clearly set forth in vari-
ous provisions of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. Section 38(1) 99 gives
the estate of the deceased partner the right to elect to have the partnership
assets liquidated, debts paid, and the share of each partner in the surplus
paid in cash. If this option is not elected (as it was not in the reported case),
the estate then has the status of a subordinate creditor, and section 42100
gives the estate an option to receive either interest on its share so long as
it remains in the business or its share of the profits arising after the date of
dissolution. This second election gives the estate a choice after the fact, and
at first blush appears unfair; it may be justified, however, on the ground that
it encourages the partnership to make a prompt settlement of accounts with
the estate of the deceased partnership. The case also holds that when valu-
ing partnership assets for the purpose of determining the share of the de-
ceased partner, the proper measure of value is current market value rather
than cost or book value. 1 1 Finally, the case holds that as a general rule the
expense of valuing the partner's interest should be paid out of the partnership
estate, rather than being assessed solely against the share of the deceased
partner. 102
II. SECURITIES REGULATION
Administrative Developments. During the survey period, the Securities and
Exchange Commission promulgated two significant regulations in its 140-
series. Rule 146103 relates to the exemption of transactions not involving a
public offering while rule 147104 relates to the exemption of intrastate issues.
Of course, there has been a great deal of experience and precedent under
these two exemptions. The new rules generally do not reverse or change
the principles that have thereby been created, and indeed in many instances
it is questionable whether the SEC could do so if it wished. Rather, the new
rules provide more objective standards by which the availability of the
exemptions may be determined; a transaction that does not fall within these
objective standards may still qualify for the exemption under preexisting prin-
ciples. Moreover, the SEC has announced that it will hereafter issue "no
action" letters under the private offering exemption "infrequently and only
in the most compelling circumstances."' 03  In other words, if a transaction
does not fall within rule 146, the person entering into the transaction is pretty
much on his own, since the SEC is unlikely to rule on the availability of the
exemption.
98. Cauble v. Handler, 503 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
99. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132b, § 38(1) (1970).
100. Id. § 42.
101. 503 S.W.2d at 364.
102. Id. at 367.
103. 39 Fed. Reg. 15266 (1974).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974).
'105. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974).
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Rule 147 is essentially a codification of prior judicial interpretations of the
instrastate exemption. The rule is based on the proposition that the purpose
of this exemption is to permit issuers with localized operations to sell
securities as part of a plan of local financing. It is limited to local financing
provided by local investors to local companies. Of course, most such trans-
actions will involve registration under the state blue sky laws, and presumably
it is in such transactions that state regulation is most effective. Rule 147
provides rather specific criteria as to when the issuer is deemed a resident
of a particular state, when prior securities are deemed "part of the issue,"
and the precautions that the issuer must take to prevent inadvertent interstate
offers and resale. The rule also requires that resales must be limited to resi-
dents of the same state during a nine-month period following the last sale
of the securities.
Rule 146 relates to the much more difficult area of defining the phrase
"transactions . . . not involving any public offering." It is difficult to give
an accurate summary of a complex rule such as rule 146. Essentially, it
places the availability of the private offering exemption on the touchstones
of (1) the access by the offerees to the same kind of information about the
issuer that registration would disclose, and (2) the ability of the offerees to
"fend for themselves" so as not to need the protections afforded by the regi-
stration. The rule makes the exemption available to offerings in which there
are no more than thirty-five purchasers, but there are substantial additional
conditions relating to limitations on the manner of offering, the nature of
offerees, access to or furnishing of information, and limitations on dispositions
of securities, including legends on certificates and share transfer restrictions.
Rule 146 does not attempt to resolve all questions relating to the "integra-
tion" of prior offerings with a proposed offering, but provides material
assistance in resolving that thorny question by providing a "safe haven" for
transactions in which there has been no prior offering during the previous
six months and no subsequent offering during the following six months.
Rule 146 also defines when persons receiving stock in a rule 145(a) trans-
action (mergers, consolidations, reclassifications, and asset transfers) may
obtain an exemption under rule 146. In such a transaction, no inquiry need
be made into the nature of the offerees; the stock received, however, is re-
stricted stock and subject to the various restrictions and limitations of rule
146.
In general, whenever questions arise under either rules 146 or 147 it is
important to examine not only the text of the rule itself but also the explana-
tory SEC release that accompanied the rule. These releases contain useful
illuminating descriptions of the scope of, and reasons for, specific provisions,
and in the case of rule 147, illustrative examples of the application of the
rule.106
106. Also helpful is the burgeoning law review commentary on rule 147. See Hicks,
Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MicH. L. REv. 463 (1974); Kant, SEC Rule 147
-A Further Narrowing of the Intrastate Offering Exemption, 30 Bus. LAW. 73 (1974);
Tilley, The Intrastate Offering Exemption, 37 TEX. B.J. 549 (1974).
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The new rules in the 140-series rely heavily on opinions of counsel as to
the availability of exemptions and seek to limit sharply the use of "no action"
letters issued by the SEC. When an attorney is requested to give a formal,
disinterested opinion as to the availability of an exemption, he may be faced
with a difficult problem as to how searching an inquiry he should make into
the facts. On the one hand, the SEC has stated that an opinion based solely
on hypothetical facts supplied by a client without any inquiry would raise a
"serious question" as to the propriety of the attorney's professional conduct.107
On the other hand, it is hardly practical to conduct a full scale audit into
the affairs of each client. The Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion
on this subject'0 8 which goes into considerable detail as to the responsibilities
of the attorney in such a situation. In general, the ABA seeks to preserve
the commonly accepted practice of accepting the facts as supplied by the
client, at least in the normal situation where the client is reputable and the
attorney has no reason to doubt the accuracy of the facts so presented.
Whether or not this practice will satisfy the SEC, which is attempting to enlist
attorneys to prevent securities violations, remains to be seen.
Definition of a "Security." The classic definition of an "investment contract,"
and, therefore, a "security" for purposes of both the Securities Act of 1933109
and the Texas Securities Act, 110 is "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... "111 The Fifth
Circuit has been liberal in applying this language to two well known and
widely publicized schemes. Glenn Turner's pyramid scheme of selling dis-
tributorships for cosmetics 1 and the issuance of "naked" commodity options
in discretionary accounts" 8 were both held to involve a "common enterprise"
and "solely" the efforts of others. In effect, the court "expressed its
preference for a resilient standard which would comport with the uniformly
acclaimed remedial purposes of the Securities Act"' 1 4 rather than a "litmus
test." Both of the schemes under discussion involved some effort and deci-
sion-making by the investor; in effect, "solely" has been redefined to mean
"primarily." The "naked" commodities option was also successfully attacked
by the State Securities Commissioner, who persuaded a court of appeals that
such accounts constituted "securities" despite the fact that the arrangements
involved some participation in decision-making by the investors.'15
107. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971).
108. Formal Opinion 335 (Feb. 2, 1974), published in 60 A.B.A.J. 488 (1974).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1971).
110. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (1964).
111. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (emphasis added).
112. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
113. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 521.
115. King Commodity Co. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
no writ). See also Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer, CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,132




Also during the survey period, the Fifth Circuit substantially rewrote
another part of the definition of a "security." A "security" includes "any
note but shall not include any note . which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months . . ". .116 In connection
with refinancing commodities options, a corporation in financial trouble and
with problems under the Securities Act issued highly speculative short-term
notes having maturities of less than nine months to its customers; these notes
represented a portion of the amounts previously paid by the customers into
accounts to be invested in commodities options. The corporation argued that
the notes could not be "securities" under the literal definition of the Securities
Act; the court held, however, that this exemption should be limited only to
high quality commercial paper and not investment securities which have most
of the characteristics of equity investment. 117 In other words, an equity in-
vestment is not exempt merely because it is dressed up as a promissory note
with a maturity date of less than nine months. To be exempt, the court
stated, a note must be (1) of prime quality, (2) used to finance a current
transaction, (3) not offered to the public, and (4) discountable at a Federal
Reserve Bank. 118 Continuing along the line of construing definitions in order
to reach sensible results, the Fifth Circuit also held that a note with a
maturity date of more than nine months may not be a security if it involves
essentially a "commercial" transaction. 19 The result of these various opin-
ions is a total revision of the statutory definition. As stated in McClure v.
First National Bank:
We realize that our holding today that the Act does not apply to com-
mercial notes of a longer duration than nine months, taken with the de-
cisions voiding the short-term exemption as to investment paper, virtu-
ally writes that exemption out of the law. On one hand, the Act covers
all investment notes, no matter how short their maturity, because they
are encompassed by the 'any note' language of the exemption. On the
other hand, the Act does not cover any commercial notes, no matter how
long their maturity, because they fall outside the 'any note' definition
of a security. Thus, the investment or commercial nature of a note
entirely controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the
exemption based on maturity-length. The original scrivener of the de-
finitional section may well wonder what happened to his carefully drawn
exemption on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial decisions do
not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the coverage of the Act,
only that body can properly rectify the situation at this point, if stare
decisis is to apply and the Supreme Court does not make some defini-
tive decision contrary to the presently decided cases. 120
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
117. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927
(1973).
118. 497 F.2d at 525. Of course, a six month note of a "commercial" nature is not
a "security" under either the Securities Act of 1933, or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
119. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
120. Id. at 494-95.
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Exemption for Distributions to Existing Shareholders. The Texas Securities
Act' 2 1 contains a transaction exemption for distributions to existing share-
holders. However, an attempt by the Spence and Green Chemical Company
to take advantage of this exemption was enjoined at the request of the
Securities Commissioner 122 on the theory that this exemption was unavailable
if the shareholders had become such in transactions which themselves were
in violation of the Securities Act. The Spence and Green Chemical Company
had sold shares to 53 persons who had in turn resold to more than 750 per-
sons totally without registration under either the federal or state acts.
Rule lOb-5. Cases involving fundamental questions about the scope and
applicability of rule 10b-5 continue to arise. For example, perhaps the best
known limitation on recovery under that rule is that the plaintiff must himself
be a purchaser or seller of securities, the famous Birnbaum doctrine first
enunciated in 1952.123 While this rule undoubtedly had been undercut by
the Supreme Court's decision in Bankers Life,"24 it suffered further erosion
during the current survey period. The Seventh Circuit went all the way and
concluded that the Birnbaum rule had lost all vitality and should not be
followed. 125 However, during the same period a panel of the Fifth Circuit
decided to adhere to Birnbaum in an opinion that reviews many of the
problem areas of rule 10b-5.26
In another recent lob-5 case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the duty
imposed by that rule should be a flexible one depending on the circumstances
and the relationships between the parties. Even though most common law
fraud concepts have disappeared from rule 10b-5, including strict ideas of
scienter, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was error to instruct a jury to
the effect that a defendant could be found liable for false statements when
he did not know that they were false when they were made.' 27
121. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(E) (1964).
122. Spence & Green Chem. Co. v. Mouer, 510 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
124. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). This
case inferentially eliminated a second requirement set forth in Birnbaum, that rule lob-
5 is "directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually as-
sociated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement
of corporate affairs .... ." 193 F.2d at 464. Bankers Life held that rule lob-5 reached
a scheme to misappropriate the proceeds of a sale of securities, and seems clearly to
constitute a garden variety of fraudulent conduct actionable under state law.
125. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). While the Supreme Court denied certiorari, three justices
noted that they felt that certiorari should be granted. The Supreme Court later granted
certiorari in another case that applies the Birnbaum limitation as well as raising other
issues. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 42 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1974) (No. 74-124). [Editor's Note: Subsequent to this
Article's going to print, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's Manor Drug
decision, holding that a private damage action under rule lob-5 is confined to actual
purchasers or sellers of securities and that the Birnbaum rule in this case barred Manor
from maintaining suit. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 43 U.S.L.W. 4707
(U.S. June 9, 1975)].
126. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974). This opinion also dis-
cusses problems under the proxy and tender offer provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (e) (1970).
127. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974).
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In recent years the great bulk of the cases involving alleged fraud in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities has been brought in the federal
courts under rule 1Ob-5. From the standpoint of a plaintiff, the federal
forum offers procedural advantages and quite possibly a more sympathetic
judge. Nevertheless, there are provisions of blue sky and other state
statutes1 28 which give remedies for conduct that also is cognizable under rule
10b-5, and a trickle of cases continue to be brought under these state statutes.
In Ryan v. Collins,1 29 for example, the court held that representations that
the stock was "hot," that it had "unlimited possibilities," and that it was a
"solid buy" were statements of opinion, not representations of fact. The
court also concluded that a promise that stock certificates would be delivered
in six or eight weeks was actionable only if made with the intention of not
fulfilling it. While such holdings may be consistent with good, classical prin-
ciples of the law of fraud, they seem out of harmony with recent develop-
ments under rule lob-5. At the very least, such statements-without further
explanation as to the speculative or fraudulent nature of the venture-would
constitute an omission "to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading" under rule lOb-5(2)."30 Holdings such as Ryan will
undoubtedly encourage future suits to be brought in the federal rather than
the state forum, at least if the attorney is aware that substantive federal law
is more favorable to plaintiffs than the classic state law relating to fraud.
In Pari Delicto. The extent to which the defense of in pari delicto should
be available in suits involving violations of the securities law is a troublesome
one. There is a strong public interest in ensuring compliance with these
statutes, and arguably the defense of in pari delicto may tend to defeat this
interest. Nevertheless, the defense was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in
a rule lob-5 proceeding, where it appeared that the plaintiff was an active
participant in a scheme to avoid old rule 133 by backdating documents.' 3 '
The same question also arose in a case under the Texas Securities Act dur-
ing the survey period. 1 32 The plaintiff desired to "get in on the ground floor"
in a venture to computerize feed lot operations on the high plains. Since
128. For example, Tx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. art. 27.01 (1968) gives a remedy
for fraud in connection with the purchase of securities.
129. 496 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1974).
131. James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974). The case follows the Fifth
Circuit's earlier decision that a "tippee" given knowingly false information by a tipper
is barred from suing the tipper by the doctrine of in pari delicto. Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). The court argued that the tipper's intent to violate
rule lOb-5 defeated recovery under that rule. There is also a "free ride" element if the
tippee is permitted to sue on false information, since if the information is true he pre-
sumably will enter into a profitable transaction in violation of rule lOb-5. Essentially
inconsistent with this holding on similar facts is Nathanson v. Weiss, Voisin, Cannon,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The role between public policy and the defense
of in pari delicto has often arisen in the antitrust context, where it has generally been
rejected. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968).




all the original shares had been sold pursuant to the private offering
exemption, the plaintiff persuaded shareholders to enter into letter agree-
ments in which the shareholders agreed to sell shares to the plaintiff to be
delivered when restrictions on transfer of certificates had been eliminated by
registration. There was immediate payment of the purchase price. These
transactions in unregistered shares almost certainly constituted flat violations
of the Texas Securities Act and were rescindable under section 33 of that
Act.133 The plaintiff apparently did not bring suit to rescind the purchase
until four years later, and suit was therefore barred under the three-year pro-
vision of section 33(C). The court, however, did not place its decision solely
on this ground. It also stated that suit to rescind was also barred by section
33(D): "No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any
contract in violation of any provision of this Act or any rule or order or re-
quirement hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under any
such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of which its making or
performance was in violation, may base any suit on the contract.' 1 34  This
provision was apparently designed only to avoid circularity: it makes little
sense to enforce a contract that the defendant may avoid. In any event, how-
ever, its literal language does not support the court's conclusion: a suit to
rescind a contract under section 33 is hardly a suit based on a contract.
Furthermore, it is widely conceded that the major impetus to registration
under state blue sky laws is the fear of civil liability under these statutes.
Given the broad public policy in favor of registration, the defense of in pari
delicto, whether of common law origin or derived by construction of section
33(,D), would appear to have no place. This certainly is the position taken
by the federal courts under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.135
Brokers and Dealers. Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines
an "intermediary" to be a person who delivers a security when "known to
be entrusted with delivery of the security on behalf of another or with col-
lection of a draft or other claim against such delivery." 13"6 An "intermedi-
ary" warrants "only his own good faith and authority even though he has pur-
chased or made advances against the claim to be collected against the
delivery. '137 In contrast, a person transferring a security to a purchaser for
value makes much broader warranties, including a warranty that the security
is genuine and has not been materially altered. In First National Bank v.
H. Hentz & Co. 138 a bank unsuccessfully sought to claim the status of "inter-
133. TEX. REV. Ov. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (1964).
134. Id. art. 581-33(D). This provision is § 410(f) of the Uniform Securities Act.
L. Loss & E. COWET, BLUE SKY LAW 394 (1958).
135. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1694 (2d ed. 1961): "And application of
the in pari delicto doctrine, at least on the basis solely of the buyer's knowledge of the
violation, is so foreign to the purpose of the section that there is hardly a trace of it
in the decisions ...... See Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 975 (1973), upholding a district judge's conclusion that in pari delicto was not
available in a suit based on violation of the Securities Act of 1933.
136. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.306(c) (1968).
137. Id.
138. 49$ S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ),
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mediary" in order to shift a loss caused by the bank's customer to a broker.
The bank had lent money to the customer in. question on the security of
shares of stock. Later, on the order of the customer, the bank sold the shares
through the broker, Hentz, and credited the proceeds against the loan. The
shares turned out to be forgeries and Hentz was forced to purchase covering
shares on the open market at a cost of over $78,000. The bank refused to
accept responsibility for this amount, arguing that it was only an "intermedi-
ary" and therefore not liable. The court, however, held that the bank was
a principal and that "[i]t is an established rule of law that a broker or agent
is entitled to reimbursement from his principal for the amount of expenditures
or losses resulting proximately or necessarily from the good faith execution
of the principal's contract.' u3 9  The court referred to pre-Code cases to
support this statement, but the same rule is embodied in section 8.306(e):
"A broker gives to his customer and to the issuer and a purchaser the war-
ranties provided in this section and has the rights and privileges of a pur-
chaser under this section. The warranties of and in favor of the broker acting
as an agent are in addition to applicable warranties given by and in favor
of his customer.' 140  The decision that the bank was a principal rather than
an intermediary seems clearly correct on the facts since the account with
Hentz was in the name of the bank and Hentz never dealt directly with the
bank's customer who ordered the forged securities sold.
In another case, a federal district court refused to permit a broker to re-
cover an amount otherwise clearly due from a customer on two grounds:
first, the broker had failed to keep accurate records of the securities held by
a customer, and second, the broker did not liquidate the customer's account
promptly after discovering that a transaction ordered by the customer was
a "fail." 141 It appeared that the broker had frozen some securities in the
customer's account but it was unclear whether they then (or ever) equaled
in value the amount paid to the customer as a result of the failed transaction.
In any event, a prompt liquidation of frozen securities would appear to be
essential if the broker is to recover from a customer, since otherwise the
customer is defenseless against changes in market value.
139. Id. at 482.
140. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.306(e) (1968) (emphasis added).
141. Pfanenstiel v. Ling & Co., 371 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
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